MMasters in Business
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FinanceMichael Carmen

Fat-Pitch Late-Stage Underwriting

Target de-risked businesses with bounded downside and credible two-to-three-times upside

Difficulty
Advanced
Time to result
~months to results
Steps
6
Confidence
96%

Fat-Pitch Late-Stage Underwriting targets companies that remain risky but have already been de-risked by products, customers, and substantial revenue. The investor estimates the company's normalized margin structure and uses it to constrain an appropriate revenue multiple. Explicit downside and upside scenarios then reveal whether prospective returns are asymmetric. Unlike seed portfolios designed around rare hundredfold winners, this approach avoids binary events and seeks a narrower outcome distribution: fewer total losses, a higher proportion of capital-positive deals, and credible two-to-three-times winners. Because investments occur later, exits and capital returns may arrive sooner, producing a shallower J-curve. The framework optimizes for repeatable portfolio compounding rather than spectacular individual outliers.

Origin

Extracted from Masters in Business, where Michael Carmen characterized Wellington's late-stage portfolio as a collection of “fat pitches.”

Core principles

  • 01Established revenue and customers reduce binary product risk
  • 02Normalized margins anchor revenue multiples
  • 03Upside should materially exceed downside
  • 04A high hit rate can compensate for sacrificing extreme moonshots
  • 05Capital-return timing matters alongside headline multiples

How to run it

  1. 1

    Confirm de-risking evidence

    Verify meaningful revenue, functioning products, real customers, and demonstrated product-market fit. Identify which risks have disappeared and which remain unresolved.

    Pro tip State the remaining scaling question explicitly, such as whether revenue can grow from $100 million to $1 billion.

    Watch out De-risked does not mean riskless.

  2. 2

    Estimate normalized economics

    Project sustainable margins after temporary growth investments and inefficiencies subside. Use sector-appropriate evidence rather than one universal metric.

    Pro tip Build conservative, base, and optimistic margin cases.

    Watch out Temporary cash burn should not be mistaken for either permanent weakness or guaranteed future profitability.

  3. 3

    Anchor the valuation

    Use normalized margins to determine a defensible price-to-revenue range. Assign lower multiples to structurally lower-margin businesses and higher ones only when economics justify them.

    Pro tip Compare the implied future valuation with relevant public companies.

    Watch out Do not award a premium multiple solely because the company is private or fashionable.

  4. 4

    Map the outcome range

    Calculate downside and upside cases using realistic growth, margin, dilution, and exit assumptions. Require meaningful upside relative to plausible loss.

    Pro tip Include a merely adequate outcome rather than modeling only success and failure.

    Watch out Binary dependencies can invalidate the fat-pitch profile.

  5. 5

    Underwrite the target return

    Test whether a credible path supports approximately two-to-three-times invested capital. Reject deals that require implausible execution or valuation expansion to reach the target.

    Pro tip Separate returns generated by business growth from returns dependent on multiple expansion.

    Watch out A high projected multiple is not credible if every assumption must go right.

  6. 6

    Evaluate portfolio fit and timing

    Assess how the investment changes the portfolio's loss rate, return distribution, and capital-return schedule. Favor opportunities that improve compounding without concentrating hidden risks.

    Pro tip Evaluate the expected J-curve alongside the gross return target.

    Watch out Several individually de-risked companies can still share the same macroeconomic or market-access risk.

In the wild

Pricing two businesses with different margins

Two private companies each generate $200 million in revenue and grow at similar rates. One is expected to normalize at a 10% margin, while the other could sustain 35%. The investor assigns a lower revenue multiple to the first, models downside and upside for both, and invests only where the entry price leaves a credible path to a two-to-three-times return.

→ Valuation reflects durable economics rather than treating equal revenue as equal value.

Avoiding a binary regulatory bet

A late-stage company has customers and revenue, but its entire expansion plan depends on one uncertain regulatory ruling. Even though the upside is large, failure would destroy most of the investment. The investor declines because the payoff resembles a seed-stage moonshot rather than a bounded late-stage outcome.

→ The portfolio preserves its intended high-hit-rate risk profile.

Common mistakes

Confusing de-risked with safe

Real revenue and customers remove some uncertainty, but execution, scale, valuation, and exit risks remain material.

Chasing hundredfold returns

Optimizing for moonshots introduces the binary outcomes this approach is designed to avoid. Its advantage comes from narrower outcomes and a higher hit rate.

Ignoring normalized margins

Revenue multiples have little meaning without understanding the profitability the revenue can eventually support.

Is it for you?

Best for

It is best for investors evaluating mature private growth companies with enough operating data to estimate normalized economics.

Not ideal for

It is not ideal for seed investing, where outcomes are highly binary and normalized financial performance cannot yet be estimated reliably.

From the transcript

“I always like to think about what's my downside risk and what's my upside potential.”

Michael Carmen · 39:19

“I always think of it this as a little bit more of a fat pitch portfolio, is that we stay away from binary events.”

Michael Carmen · 40:41

“No, we we underwrite to a two to three x return on our investment.”

Michael Carmen · 41:00

From the episode

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