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Joel Greenblatt20 April 2018

Joel Greenblatt Discusses the Thrill of Investing

5Frameworks
11Insights

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The myth-busts, hot takes, explainers, and tools worth keeping.

Myth Buster· 1

Myth Buster24:34

The Best Fund Can Still Be a Terrible Investor Experience

A top-performing mutual fund gained 18% annually during a flat-market decade, yet its average investor lost 11% a year by entering after strong performance and exiting after weakness. Greenblatt adds that even the best long-term institutional managers commonly spend years near the bottom of rankings, making them exceptionally difficult to hold.

  • Fund returns and investor returns can diverge dramatically.
  • Performance chasing can destroy the benefit of excellent management.
  • Half of the best ten-year institutional managers spent at least three years in the bottom decile.
  • Active management must differ from the market, so underperformance periods are unavoidable.

“the average investor in that fund managed to lose eleven percent a year on a dollar weighted basis by moving in and out at all…”

Joel Greenblatt · 24:47

“if you do, it's almost impossible to stick with them because to beat the market you have to do something different than the market.”

Joel Greenblatt · 26:27
#behavior gap#active management#fund selection#performance chasing

Hot Take· 2

Hot Take21:25

Why Lower Fees and Easier Exits Made Gotham's Capital Stickier

Gotham rejected conventional hedge-fund economics by removing performance fees, charging more moderate management fees, and offering monthly liquidity. Greenblatt argues that expensive fees make clients impatient, while the comfort of accessible capital can reduce the urge to withdraw it.

  • High fees increase clients' sensitivity to short-term underperformance.
  • Monthly liquidity avoids recurring lockup decisions at potentially bad times.
  • Accessible money proved sticky rather than flighty.
  • Reasonable hedge-fund fees made later mutual-fund expansion possible without diluting the strategy.

“you're charging too much to your clients and they don't stay very long because they're, uh, they're impatient when they're they're paying so much.”

Joel Greenblatt · 21:42

“what it is is a comfort to know you could always have it and actually the money stick here.”

Joel Greenblatt · 22:44
#fees#liquidity#hedge funds#alignment
Hot Take45:05

Greenblatt's Evidence That Market Inefficiency Is Still Alive

Asked whether computers and sophisticated funds had eliminated opportunity, Greenblatt points to repeated doubling and halving of the S&P 500 over just two decades. Dispersion among individual constituents is even larger, suggesting emotional behavior, agency problems, and extreme deviations from fair value remain pervasive.

  • The most-followed market still experiences enormous valuation swings.
  • Index averages understate dispersion among individual companies.
  • Market opportunity persists because human emotion and institutional incentives persist.
  • The obstacle is investor behavior, not an absence of mispriced securities.

“which is which is my way of telling them that people are still crazy.”

Joel Greenblatt · 46:17

“The reason investors don't beat the market has nothing to do with the market is not throwing us pitches, and that it's not still emotional.”

Joel Greenblatt · 47:08
#market efficiency#behavioral finance#volatility#opportunity

Explainer· 4

Explainer12:55

How Gotham Capital's Size and Concentration Shaped Its Returns

Greenblatt attributes Gotham Capital's extraordinary early record partly to staying small and concentrating most of the portfolio in six to eight ideas. He also explicitly credits luck, resisting the temptation to present the record as the inevitable output of skill alone.

  • Gotham returned half its outside capital after five years and all of it after ten.
  • Six to eight ideas commonly represented more than 80% of the portfolio.
  • Limited capacity helped preserve the opportunity set.
  • Greenblatt says luck was necessary to achieve returns of that magnitude.

“one of the ways to to get those kind of returns is not to run a lot of money.”

Joel Greenblatt · 13:04

“one was I said we stayed small. Two we were concentrated, and three really we got lucky.”

Joel Greenblatt · 59:34
#hedge funds#concentration#capacity#luck
Explainer1:00:38

Why Greenblatt Moved From Eight Positions to Hundreds

Greenblatt explains that a concentrated portfolio requires being right on individual names and periodically produces severe losses even when the general process is sound. A diversified long-short portfolio allowed Gotham to apply its valuation skill across hundreds of companies, reduce aberrational outcomes, and be right on average.

  • Concentration exposed the portfolio to severe company-specific outcomes.
  • Diversification reduced the frequency of negative compounding.
  • Long-short leverage made broad diversification especially valuable.
  • The insurance analogy shows why good underwriting still needs a large sample.

“When we discovered that we can actually make more money having diversified portfolios”

Joel Greenblatt · 1:01:44

“they want to be right on average, so they're gonna be right over hundreds or thousands of people.”

Joel Greenblatt · 1:02:40
#diversification#portfolio construction#long-short#risk
Explainer27:45

Inside Gotham Index Plus: An Index With a Long-Short Overlay

Gotham Index Plus recreates the S&P 500 with individual stocks, then adds a 90% long allocation to favored constituents and a 90% short allocation to the least favored. The overlay is constrained for beta, position influence, and fundamental balance to seek excess return without diverging so sharply that investors abandon it.

  • The base dollar recreates the S&P 500 from individual stocks.
  • The overlay adds 90 cents long and 90 cents short.
  • The overlay is designed for zero beta.
  • Small stocks are prevented from driving portfolio returns.
  • Long and short books are balanced on fundamentals such as sales growth.

“you give us a dollar, we're gonna buy the underlying stocks in the SNP five hundred.”

Joel Greenblatt · 28:09

“One is there's a zero beta. Two is that small stocks won't drive returns. Three is that we balance fundamental”

Joel Greenblatt · 31:10
#index plus#long-short#tracking error#portfolio design
Explainer31:49

Why Expensive Hope Stocks Become Vulnerable in Downturns

Greenblatt describes richly valued companies as hope stocks because buyers pay today for optimistic future outcomes. In weak markets, compressed expectations can punish those securities severely, while cash-generative companies bought at low expectations may hold up better.

  • High multiples embed demanding future expectations.
  • Bad markets can rapidly remove the premium paid for hope.
  • Cheap cash-generative companies carry lower embedded expectations.
  • A long-cheap and short-expensive spread may strengthen during market declines.

“These are hope stocks. People really thinking they're buying them now, not on current earnings, but two thousand twenty two.”

Joel Greenblatt · 30:29

“we don't pay for high expectations in the long book.”

Joel Greenblatt · 34:15
#valuation#bear markets#expectations#short selling

Story· 3

Story02:23

The Dog-Track Mistake That Made a Cheap Investing Lesson

Greenblatt and his cousin bet on a dog whose recorded time looked vastly superior, only to learn that it had run a shorter race. The loss taught him that impressive data is useless without understanding its context, and that ignorance becomes far more expensive when transferred to investing.

  • A standout number may measure a different underlying event.
  • Context must be verified before comparing performance.
  • Small experimental losses can prevent much larger financial mistakes.

“You know, that dog had been running a shorter race. That's why it only ran thirty two seconds.”

Joel Greenblatt · 03:20

“you sort of really have to know something when you're betting, and and the same thing for investing.”

Joel Greenblatt · 03:26
#data quality#risk#investing
Story10:26

Holding a Bottom Line While Michael Milken Kept Revlon Waiting

While negotiating the backing for Gotham Capital, Greenblatt refused to surrender terms that would govern his professional life, even though the deal was tiny to Michael Milken. Milken eventually sent his brother into the room, and Greenblatt obtained the terms he wanted.

  • The economic importance of a deal differs for each party.
  • A clear bottom line can compensate for limited negotiating skill.
  • Greenblatt accepted the risk of losing the deal rather than accepting life-defining terms he opposed.

“after half hour, I got the terms I wanted from his brother.”

Joel Greenblatt · 12:16
#negotiation#entrepreneurship#hedge funds
Story1:09:20

The Comdex Investment That Exposed Operating Leverage's Dark Side

Greenblatt loved a trade-show company because incremental exhibition space cost roughly two dollars and could be resold for sixty-two, producing enormous contribution margins. After the company borrowed to acquire another show and 9/11 suppressed travel, the same operating leverage drove missing revenue directly through the bottom line and turned a major winner into his worst investment.

  • High incremental margins create powerful upside when volume grows.
  • The same fixed-cost structure magnifies losses when revenue falls.
  • Acquisition debt compounded the vulnerability before an external shock.
  • Greenblatt sold much of a position that had reached $12 at about $1.

“on the way up, just like financial leverage, it's a lot of fun, and on the way down, operating leverage on the way down is…”

Joel Greenblatt · 1:11:19

“So I got out of most of my stock at about a dollar”

Joel Greenblatt · 1:11:28
#operating leverage#investment failure#risk#comdex

Takeaway· 1

Takeaway1:11:39

Greenblatt's Unusually Blunt Advice to Future Fund Managers

Greenblatt tells students that investment management offers limited incremental social value and disproportionately high rewards for those who succeed. He does not discourage people who genuinely enjoy the field, but asks them to use their ability, drive, and earnings to give back elsewhere.

  • Capital allocation has value, but much of the work would occur without any one manager.
  • Successful investment professionals can be overpaid relative to their social contribution.
  • Enjoying the profession is legitimate.
  • Skill and financial success create an obligation to contribute beyond investing.

“I don't think there's a lot of social value in being a investment manager.”

Joel Greenblatt · 1:12:01

“we get way overpaid in this businesses we're successful”

Joel Greenblatt · 1:12:49
#career advice#finance careers#social impact#giving back