MMasters in Business
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William Sharpe02 June 2017

Interview With William Sharpe: Masters in Business (Audio)

4Frameworks
12Insights

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Frameworks in this episode

Insights & moments

The myth-busts, hot takes, explainers, and tools worth keeping.

Myth Buster· 1

Myth Buster1:24:50

How High Return Assumptions Make Pension Liabilities Look Smaller

Sharpe argues that public pension promises should be valued like bond-like obligations, using rates appropriate to their risk. Instead, discounting liabilities at a fund's optimistic expected return lowers their reported present value and creates pressure to allocate to hedge funds or private equity with higher assumed returns.

  • Promised pension payments resemble bond obligations.
  • A higher discount rate lowers the reported present value of liabilities.
  • Better-looking funding ratios reduce apparent contribution requirements.
  • High assumed returns can encourage allocations to expensive alternative assets.
  • Sharpe rejects the host's legal conclusion of fraud.

“they should be valued like bonds.”

William Sharpe · 1:26:01

“if we increase our expected return, we can discount the promised payments at a higher rate, and their present value will be lower”

William Sharpe · 1:26:55
#pensions#discount rates#liabilities#alternative assets

Explainer· 4

Explainer18:56

Why Sharpe No Longer Uses CAPM in His Own Models

Sharpe explains that the capital asset pricing model grew from a mean-variance view in which higher expected return accompanies higher market beta. He now uses the more general pricing-kernel approach, which preserves similar practical implications while extending more naturally across multiple periods.

  • CAPM links expected return to market beta in a mean-variance setting.
  • The model's economic message is that market risk earns the reward.
  • Pricing-kernel theory can produce a curved rather than linear relationship.
  • The later approach extends more naturally to multi-period problems.

“it's market risk that matters. That's what you get rewarded for. Other risks you don't get paid for.”

William Sharpe · 20:03

“I do not use the capitalized pricing model in my models in my work”

William Sharpe · 21:42
#capm#pricing kernel#asset pricing#beta
Explainer29:35

Why Finance Still Uses Variance When Investors Fear the Downside

Sharpe agrees that people weigh downside outcomes more heavily than upside surprises, making semi-variance intuitively attractive. Yet downside-only equilibrium models become mathematically difficult, while diversified return distributions are often symmetric enough for standard deviation to serve as a workable approximation.

  • Semi-variance isolates adverse deviations rather than all volatility.
  • Behavioural evidence supports heavier concern about losses.
  • Downside-only equilibrium mathematics becomes difficult.
  • Diversification can make variance and downside measures yield similar signals.

“people wait downside much more heavily than they wait upside.”

William Sharpe · 30:10

“because the mathematics gets so so ugly, we tend to stay with variants”

William Sharpe · 31:15
#downside risk#variance#semi-variance#behavioural finance
Explainer31:42

How Uninformed Individuals Can Still Produce Informative Prices

Sharpe says no individual investor needs to understand everything for market prices to incorporate dispersed information. In simulations where each participant knows only a little, trading can aggregate those fragments into surprisingly efficient prices.

  • Individual investors possess incomplete information.
  • Market influence is unequal because wealthier participants command more resources.
  • Trading can combine scattered information into prices.
  • Collective intelligence can exceed any one participant's knowledge.

“None of us really knows what we're doing, and yet magically the prices end up incorporating all the information.”

William Sharpe · 33:22

“all of us is smarter than any one of us.”

William Sharpe · 33:45
#market efficiency#collective intelligence#prices#information
Explainer57:30

Why the First Equal-Weighted Index Design Was a Bad Idea

Sharpe describes an early Wells Fargo index concept that held hundreds of stocks in equal weights. He says it failed to represent the market and required continual rebalancing, whereas a broad market-cap-weighted portfolio largely adjusts itself as prices move.

  • Equal weighting does not represent the market portfolio.
  • Maintaining equal weights creates turnover.
  • Market-cap weights change automatically with market prices.
  • A broad cap-weighted fund mainly needs adjustments for issues entering or leaving.

“it's not representative the market, it's not consistent with the capital asser pricing”

William Sharpe · 58:51

“with a market based portfolio, you only rebalance for new issues and things of that sort.”

William Sharpe · 59:04
#index funds#market cap#equal weight#turnover

Story· 3

Story26:15

The 2 A.M. Call That Reveals Real Risk Tolerance

Peter Bernstein told Sharpe that a client's true risk tolerance becomes visible after a severe market day, when a previously confident investor calls in distress. Sharpe adds that questionnaires are often unsatisfying because recent market performance strongly colours people's stated tolerance.

  • Calm markets make risk tolerance easy to overstate.
  • Severe losses reveal the emotional limit that abstract questions miss.
  • Recent performance changes how investors describe their own tolerance.
  • Risk tolerance is difficult to capture with a stable questionnaire score.

“after the markets had a really bad day and I get a call at two am saying I can't take it.”

William Sharpe · 26:46

“It's so colored by what just happened.”

William Sharpe · 29:00
#risk tolerance#behaviour#losses#investors
Story50:41

The Coffee Meeting That Turned Research Into Financial Engines

After returning to Stanford, Sharpe focused on helping people make better choices in 401(k) plans and published early internet tools. Law professor Joe Grundfest argued that research alone would not reach enough people, leading Sharpe, Grundfest, Craig Johnson, and Jeff Maggioncalda to build Financial Engines.

  • Sharpe shifted from institutional portfolios to individual accumulation.
  • He initially distributed research and small tools over the early internet.
  • Joe Grundfest pushed for a company to reach more people.
  • The founding team aimed to deliver advice through employer retirement plans.

“you're not gonna affect enough people with this work. We need to start a firm.”

William Sharpe · 52:21

“set up a firm to provide financial advice. Two people in four oh one k plans through their employer.”

William Sharpe · 52:56
#financial engines#startup#401k#financial advice
Story1:32:09

What Long-Term Capital Management Shows About Leverage

A family Sharpe advised was forced to redeem from Long-Term Capital Management shortly before the fund failed. Looking back, Sharpe's simple lesson is that leverage magnifies gains and losses, and sophisticated structures do not remove that basic exposure even when the people and models are exceptionally smart.

  • An early investor was redeemed before LTCM's collapse.
  • Leverage can magnify both profit and loss.
  • LTCM's leverage was embedded in complex positions.
  • Exceptional intelligence did not prevent the failure.
  • Simple risk logic can matter more than model sophistication.

“leverage can make you a lot of money, and it can lose you a lot of money.”

William Sharpe · 1:32:55

“sometimes simple is better than complicated.”

William Sharpe · 1:34:25
#ltcm#leverage#hedge funds#risk

Takeaway· 4

Takeaway08:01

Judge a Theory by Its Results, Not by Perfect Assumptions

Sharpe recalls that an early referee rejected his asset-pricing paper because an assumption was unrealistic. His response, learned from economists including Milton Friedman, is that simplifying assumptions are unavoidable and a theory should be evaluated by whether its conclusions conform to the real world.

  • CAPM's publication was delayed after an initial rejection.
  • The referee objected to an unrealistic assumption.
  • Sharpe argues that theories necessarily simplify reality.
  • The more important test is whether the resulting predictions fit observed outcomes.

“you don't evaluate a theory of that sort on the assumption. You evaluated on the conformance of the results with the real world”

William Sharpe · 08:43
#theory#assumptions#research#economics
Takeaway1:19:17

Sharpe's Preferred Risky Portfolio for a Retiree

For a retiree who does not want substantial risk, Sharpe favours a global portfolio of US and non-US stocks and bonds in roughly market-cap proportions. He would mix that risky portfolio with Treasury inflation-protected securities for someone who wants still less risk.

  • The risky portfolio spans US and non-US stocks and bonds.
  • Holdings should broadly reflect market-cap proportions.
  • The design can be implemented with several index funds.
  • TIPS reduce risk for retirees especially concerned about inflation.

“a portfolio maybe four different index funds, US non US bonds and stocks in more or less market cap proportions”

William Sharpe · 1:19:41

“My preferred vehicle would be tips”

William Sharpe · 1:20:34
#retirement#index funds#tips#asset allocation
Takeaway1:46:25

Sharpe's Career Advice for a Technology-Disrupted Future

Sharpe tells younger people that nobody can confidently predict which careers will endure. His recommendation is a genuinely broad education that builds the ability and willingness to think, learn, and adapt as technology automates work with routine elements.

  • Career forecasts are highly uncertain.
  • Routine professions and trades are exposed to automation.
  • Broad education preserves adaptability.
  • Learning ability matters more than training for one fixed role.
  • Algorithmic thinking helps people understand the systems changing work.

“you'd better get a really broad education.”

William Sharpe · 1:46:49

“you need the ability to think and to be and to learn, and the willingness.”

William Sharpe · 1:47:18
#careers#education#technology#adaptability
Takeaway1:49:18

Why Sharpe Shifted From Lecturing to Guided Practice

While teaching children to code, Sharpe moved from demonstrating every step to letting students solve interactive problems and experiment in Scratch. He found that a purely self-guided sequence eventually became boring, so he moved toward a mixed, collaborative approach with frequent feedback and branching support.

  • Long lectures are a weak way to convey information.
  • Interactive exercises force learners to think and act.
  • Immediate feedback lets students advance or revisit material.
  • Purely self-guided work can lose engagement over time.
  • A mixed collaborative approach balances structure and creativity.

“being the stage on the stage, being the guide by the side.”

William Sharpe · 1:50:13

“the collaborative approach seems to be more effective than just lecturing.”

William Sharpe · 1:51:31
#learning#teaching#feedback#coding