MMasters in Business
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01 September 2016

Interview With Bill McBride: Masters in Business (Audio)

3Frameworks
15Insights

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Frameworks in this episode

Insights & moments

The myth-busts, hot takes, explainers, and tools worth keeping.

Myth Buster· 1

Myth Buster1:17:46

Why McBride Did Not See Auto Loans as the Next Subprime

McBride was not especially worried that auto loans would recreate the mortgage crisis. Cars are easier to repossess, embedded technology can increase payment discipline, and crisis-era households often kept paying car loans because vehicles were essential for work and daily life.

  • Cars can be repossessed more quickly than houses can be foreclosed.
  • Remote shutoff technology increased lenders' leverage over missed payments.
  • In car-dependent places, borrowers strongly prioritize vehicle payments.
  • During the foreclosure crisis, some households paid car loans while skipping mortgages.

“a lot of people focus on the auto loans, but you know auto loans at car the cars are easy to repossess.”

Bill McBride · 1:18:06

“During the four closure crisis, people were paying their car loans, but they weren't paying their house loans.”

Bill McBride · 1:18:33
#auto loans#credit risk#subprime#consumer debt

Hot Take· 1

Hot Take1:15:09

The Missing Ingredient in Raising Lower Incomes

McBride argues that improving outcomes for lower-income workers requires higher wages and stronger bargaining power. He sees a higher minimum wage as useful, especially in expensive cities, but views some form of worker bargaining as the deeper structural issue.

  • A higher minimum wage also affects workers earning just above the floor.
  • Local living costs affect which wage level is workable.
  • Private-sector union power had weakened substantially.
  • McBride connects weaker worker bargaining with weaker middle-class income.

“one of the key things is is you've got to have wages up. You have to get wages up for the lower income workers.”

Bill McBride · 1:15:24

“the key is more bargaining power for workers of some sort.”

Bill McBride · 1:15:48
#wages#bargaining power#unions#minimum wage

Explainer· 4

Explainer24:17

Why Demographics Helped Slow US Growth After the Recession

McBride rejects the claim that the recession never ended and points to rising employment and positive, if slow, GDP growth. He argues that weak measured productivity and a shrinking prime-working-age population both helped restrain the pace of expansion.

  • Employment had risen substantially since 2009.
  • Positive but slow GDP growth was not the same as an ongoing recession.
  • The prime-working-age population declined for several years starting around 2010.
  • Baby-boomer aging reduced the population within prime working ages.

“employment is up substantially since two thousand nine.”

Bill McBride · 24:29

“the prime working age population started decreasing, not not workforce but population in about two thousand and ten and decrease for five or six years.”

Bill McBride · 24:53
#demographics#gdp#employment#productivity
Explainer30:45

How Buy-to-Rent Investors Locked Homes Out of the Sales Market

McBride says post-crisis investors bought millions of homes to rent, often at deep discounts, and largely kept them. Rising rents and attractive returns on their original investment gave owners little reason to sell, contributing to low inventory at the lower end of the housing market.

  • Large and small investors bought homes for rental income after the crash.
  • Fix-and-flip inventory returns to the market, while buy-to-rent inventory often does not.
  • Rents rose substantially after investors bought at discounted prices.
  • Comparable replacement returns were difficult to find if owners sold.

“there's millions of homes that were bought to rent and at a huge discount right the height of the crisis.”

Bill McBride · 31:18

“for the most part, none of them are selling”

Bill McBride · 31:38
#housing inventory#rentals#private equity#real estate
Explainer1:02:00

Why Housing Trade Groups Do Not All Behave Like Cheerleaders

McBride distinguishes the Mortgage Bankers Association and home builders, whose members need realistic operating information, from the National Association of Realtors, which he describes as more promotional. He says the NAR's data was real but sampled and spun positively, sometimes giving sellers unrealistic expectations during a falling market.

  • Mortgage bankers and builders need candid industry information for operating decisions.
  • The NAR sampled selected large multiple-listing services.
  • Positive interpretation can be misleading even when the underlying data is real.
  • Optimistic national messaging made local price conversations harder for agents.

“National Associated Homebuilders same thing than are For some reason, they're more cheerleader oriented”

Bill McBride · 1:03:29

“I'm not saying the NORDS data isn't real. They just they they spin it.”

Bill McBride · 1:04:35
#realtors#housing industry#incentives#market spin
Explainer1:39:34

Why Lenders Made Mortgages They Knew Would Fail

McBride says the housing bubble initially puzzled him because lending money to borrowers who could not repay seemed irrational. The originate-to-distribute model resolved the puzzle: lenders could sell loans onward, while highly rated securities offered buyers more yield than other instruments carrying the same rating.

  • Mortgage underwriting incentives changed from repayment to distribution.
  • Ratings let weak loans enter securities presented as high quality.
  • Investors sought extra yield among instruments carrying similar ratings.
  • Short warranties left originators with little long-term default exposure.

“why why are they making these mortgages to people that are never going to pay them?”

Bill McBride · 1:39:42

“Once you realize how that whole mechanism worked, and then it was obvious how it happened.”

Bill McBride · 1:40:23
#mortgage crisis#securitization#incentives#originate to distribute

Story· 5

Story04:08

Before Calculated Risk, McBride Built Digital Cardiac Telemetry

McBride co-founded a medical-device company that adapted emerging digital and cellular technology to in-hospital cardiac monitoring. The company designed telemetry for major device makers, went public, and was later sold to GE Medical.

  • McBride entered medical devices from telecommunications and chemistry rather than medicine.
  • The device let patients walk around a hospital while remaining monitored.
  • Major medical-device companies sold the telemetry under their own names.
  • The company went public before being acquired by GE Medical.

“we used some of the cell phone technology to make the first digital cardiac telemetry.”

Bill McBride · 05:01

“we we designed telemetry for most of the major medical device companies.”

Bill McBride · 05:45
#medical devices#telemetry#innovation#entrepreneurship
Story19:51

How a Brilliant Commenter Became Calculated Risk's Mortgage Expert

McBride met the mortgage banker known as Tanta when she corrected his posts in the Calculated Risk comments. After a stage-four ovarian-cancer diagnosis led her to leave work, he invited her to write for the site, where her detailed explanations earned recognition from Federal Reserve researchers.

  • Tanta first established credibility by correcting mortgage details in comments.
  • McBride verified her corrections with his mortgage-banker contacts.
  • Her long, detailed posts explained mortgage issues from inside the industry.
  • Federal Reserve writers credited and learned from her work.

“that's how I actually got to know my code blogger. Through the comments. That's where I met her.”

Bill McBride · 20:25

“She would explain mortgage uh issues in complete detail and all that stuff still on the blog.”

Bill McBride · 21:41
#tanta#mortgages#blogging#expertise
Story41:39

How Economic Bloggers Forced Newsrooms to Credit Their Work

McBride says reporters often used bloggers' help but editors initially refused to identify Calculated Risk as a source. After Tanta publicly argued for standard attribution, mentions increased, and the relationship evolved until journalists actively sent articles to bloggers for possible links.

  • Reporters privately sought McBride's analysis and story angles.
  • Editors were initially more comfortable citing formal titles than blogs.
  • Tanta's criticism emphasized ordinary sourcing standards.
  • News outlets later recognized that blog links could send valuable traffic back to them.

“if if if you want to use our information point you really should mention that you where you got it from.”

Bill McBride · 44:39

“it was immediately after that that we started getting mentioned everywhere.”

Bill McBride · 45:02
#journalism#attribution#blogs#media
Story50:57

Why Tanta's Obituary Ended McBride's Online Anonymity

McBride initially wrote anonymously because it felt natural and fun, then stayed anonymous to avoid putting pressure on Tanta while she hoped to return to mortgage work. His real name appeared publicly when the New York Times quoted him in her obituary, making anonymity no longer meaningful.

  • Calculated Risk began under a pseudonymous identity without a commercial plan.
  • Tanta feared that candid industry writing could hurt future employment.
  • McBride maintained his own anonymity partly to protect hers.
  • The New York Times obituary linked his real identity to the blog.

“as long as she wanted to stay anonymous, I stayed anonymous too. I didn't want pressure on her.”

Bill McBride · 51:46

“the first time my name actually came out was in the obituary in the New York Times.”

Bill McBride · 51:51
#anonymity#tanta#calculated risk#identity
Story1:32:42

How Calculated Risk Grew Without Advertising

McBride says he built Calculated Risk by writing continuously, tolerating low initial traffic, and letting readers and other writers distribute useful posts. He did not advertise or routinely pitch journalists, and he cautions that a new specialist blog should begin as a passion-driven sideline rather than an assumed moneymaker.

  • Early readership consisted largely of friends and relatives.
  • Mentions by economists and other blogs produced step changes in traffic.
  • Consistent writing compounded over years rather than creating instant success.
  • McBride does not present specialist blogging as a dependable primary income.

“I just wrote and wrote and wrote and and people started picking up.”

Bill McBride · 1:33:08

“you just have to work at it and be and put up with a low traffic to start.”

Bill McBride · 1:34:43
#blog growth#audience building#writing#calculated risk

Q&A· 1

Q&A1:13:30

Was MERS a Cause of the Mortgage Crisis or an Enabler?

McBride likes the general idea of an electronic mortgage registry but says MERS was implemented poorly. He and Ritholtz agree it was not a root cause of the crisis, yet its ability to accelerate transfers and bypass local processes helped the system produce more mortgages.

  • An electronic registry could support mortgage-backed securities in principle.
  • Implementation failed to secure sufficient public and local authority.
  • Poor tracking contributed to uncertainty over mortgage ownership.
  • MERS increased speed and scale without being the original source of bad lending.

“first of all, it was implemented poorly. Once it's implemented poorly, it's a bad system.”

Bill McBride · 1:14:02

“definitely not a cause, but definitely an enabler.”

Bill McBride · 1:14:54
#mers#mortgages#financial crisis#securitization

Takeaway· 3

Takeaway34:48

The Rise and Fall of Blog Comments as a Research Network

Ritholtz and McBride remember early blog comments as an unusually useful layer of correction, local knowledge, and source discovery. Over time, off-topic cliques, trolling, and unreliable material displaced much of that value, while moderation became an expensive burden.

  • Early comments often remained on topic and improved the original analysis.
  • Readers supplied niche articles and local observations that writers could not find alone.
  • Registration reduced drive-by abuse but did not preserve topical focus.
  • Modern social posts can reproduce local color while adding authenticity risk.

“when I would post something, the topics were on topic. I mean the comments were on topic, uh and insightful.”

Bill McBride · 37:30

“The golden age of blog comments was unlike anything.”

Barry Ritholtz · 39:44
#blog comments#online communities#research#moderation
Takeaway1:09:54

Why Underpricing Can Beat Chasing a Falling Housing Market

When McBride's mother sold near the housing downturn, he reviewed the expanding local inventory and recommended pricing below competing listings. She sold quickly, while other sellers repeatedly cut prices but remained behind the falling market.

  • Expanding inventory signaled that competing listings were becoming less scarce.
  • A fast realistic price protected the seller from further deterioration.
  • Repeated reductions can leave a listing perpetually above the current market.
  • Emotional attachment does not increase what a new buyer will pay.

“the inventory was really expanding, and I said, let's underprice everybody”

Bill McBride · 1:10:06

“chasing the market is one of the worst things you can do.”

Barry Ritholtz · 1:10:55
#home selling#pricing#falling markets#real estate
Takeaway1:26:25

The Deal of the Century Comes Along Every Year

McBride recalls his father's reminder that investors do not need to chase every apparent opportunity. Another attractive deal is likely to appear within months or a year, so urgency alone is not a reason to act.

  • Scarcity pressure can make an ordinary deal feel unique.
  • Passing on one opportunity does not end the opportunity set.
  • Patience protects investors from decisions driven by urgency.

“the deal of the century comes along every year”

Bill McBride · 1:26:27

“There'll be another good opportunity six months from now or a year from now.”

Bill McBride · 1:26:37
#patience#investing#opportunity#decision making